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Lars Aagaard-Mogensen’s recent book, The Possibility of the Sublime, takes as its subject a 
particularly eye-catching and bold claim that challenges the growing enthusiasm in the 
contemporary literature for postmodern and Kantian accounts of the sublime: In ‘Is a Theory of 
the Sublime Possible?’, Jane Forsey argues that a theory of the sublime is not possible in 
response to Guy Sircello’s positive thesis.1 As is highlighted in the author-meets-critics layout 
of Aagaard-Mogensen’s book, this view attracts several critics. The first chapter is a reprint of 
Forsey’s contentious 2007 essay, which is followed by six chapters, each of which written by a 
philosopher who argues that a theory of the sublime is possible. The book closes with Forsey’s 
replies to these commentators (entitled ‘The Sublime, Redux’).  
Forsey essentially argues that a theory of the sublime is not possible because no single 
theory can avoid or resolve all three of the following challenges: 1) the transcendence paradox, 
2) distinguishing the sublime from other aesthetic experiences, such as beauty, and 3) the 
paradox of negative emotion. This reasoning is reflected in both Forsey’s discussion of Sircello 
and Malcolm Budd’s sublime (in her 2007 essay) and her responses to critics in ‘The Sublime, 
Redux.’  
Forsey’s first challenge to theorists of the sublime—the transcendence paradox—comes 
from Sircello’s essay, where he discusses the problems with the view that “An experience of the 
 
1 Guy Sircello, “How is a Theory of the Sublime Possible?”, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 
51 (1993), pp.541-550 and Jane Forsey, “Is a Theory of the Sublime Possible?”, The Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism 65 (2007), pp.381-389. 
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sublime presents the object of the experience, i.e., the sublime, as epistemologically 
inaccessible” and, further, the “experience of the sublime” denotes an experience of an object.2 
This leads to an incoherence tantamount to having a visual experience of an invisible object; the 
experience represents this object as existing, yet it is completely inaccessible to our cognitive 
powers, something “on a level of being…which transcends that of humankind and all of 
humankind’s possible environments.”3 How can we have and describe an experience that 
presents an object that is in no way epistemologically accessible, an existent object that is 
inaccessible to our modes of experiencing? Furthermore, descriptions of sublime experience that 
avoid this incoherence fall into contradiction instead. When we describe towering mountains or 
stormy seas as sublime objects, we treat these objects simultaneously as transcendent (in 
identifying them as sublime) and as familiar, as accessible to thought (in being able to describe 
them). 
To avoid the transcendence paradox, theorists such as Sircello and Budd consider or 
provide purely epistemological accounts which focus on the subject’s experience of cognitive 
failure rather than on the troublesome object of the sublime. For example, Budd drops the 
problematic aspect of moral transcendence (Kant’s view that the sublime experience reveals the 
transcendent self as moral legislator) and instead describes the sublime as involving the 
subject’s realization of her limitations, vulnerability, or insignificance, and this realization 
bringing with it a certain pleasure after the initial shock. But, according to Forsey, Budd’s 
account faces her other two challenges due to this exclusion of moral transcendence.  
Though the general structure of Budd’s sublime—i.e., displeasure leading to pleasure—
is, to Forsey, a necessary component for capturing what is distinct about this experience, she 
explains that his account does not adequately distinguish the sublime from many other 
experiences; it is far too inclusive. For example, feeling one’s own limitations in trying (and 
failing) to solve a difficult New York Times crossword puzzle falls within Budd’s account. 
Further, since Budd focuses only on the subject’s cognitive limitations, his theory could not 
 
2 Forsey (2017) pp.2-3 / Sircello (1993) p.545.  
3 Forsey (2017) p.4 / Sircello (1993) p.545. 
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include examples of Kant’s dynamic sublime. The latter are experiences of the subject’s 
physical vulnerability in response to objects that can be cognized, such as towering mountains.  
For Forsey, the challenge of distinguishing the sublime from other experiences is 
wrapped into her third and most formidable challenge: the paradox of negative emotion. She 
explains, “what is supposed to make the sublime distinct is that we can be moved to pleasure by 
what should not please us in its contra-purposiveness, and it is this that is so difficult to 
explain.”4 Accordingly, she asks of Budd’s account and most of the commentaries in Aagaard-
Mogensen’s book: why does the awareness of one’s limitations (cognitive or otherwise) lead to 
pleasure? Why does it not lead to frustration, humiliation, or determination to overcome failure? 
Forsey indicates that there are only two ways out of the paradox, both of which are unappealing: 
either hold that the sublime is an aesthetic experience that contains no pleasurable aspect (which 
goes against common intuitions), or keep Kantian moral transcendence in the experience (in 
which case we run up against the transcendence paradox). According to Forsey, no aesthetician 
has adequately resolved this paradox. 
I have two criticisms of Forsey’s essays, both of which are supported by Tom Hanauer 
and Sandra Shapshay (two commentators in the book). The first is highlighted in Hanauer and 
Shapshay’s responses to Forsey and has been intimated in much of my discussion above: while 
Hanauer and Shapshay note the importance of stating clearly the criteria for an adequate theory 
of the sublime (and explicitly propose and defend some criteria of their own), it is unclear 
whether Forsey’s criteria, which are scattered throughout her two essays, form an exhaustive 
list. Being clear about (and defending) what counts as an adequate account is crucial in 
determining what routes are available to theorists in navigating through Forsey’s three 
challenges and, ultimately, whether an adequate theory of the sublime is possible. For instance, 
Hanauer offers a way to resolve the transcendence paradox, claiming that oftentimes we have 
partial epistemic access to a sublime object—the object is obscure rather than totally 
inaccessible. This solution works for Hanauer because he argues that an adequate theory need 
 
4 Forsey (2017) p.100.  
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not account for the type of epistemological transcendence with which Forsey is concerned—
where the object, such as God, is completely epistemologically inaccessible—as it is not an 
essential or core part of sublimity. While Forsey notes that Hanauer’s view about partial 
epistemic access has limitations (it does not provide a way to distinguish the sublime from other 
aesthetic experiences nor to resolve the paradox of negative emotion), she does not comment on 
nor give us reason to reject his argument about what is not required of an adequate theory. If we 
can adopt Hanauer’s latter view, this opens new pathways toward an adequate theory of the 
sublime. At the very least, Hanauer and Shapshay highlight this critical task which is not 
sufficiently addressed by Forsey. 
The second criticism is that even though no theorist to date has developed a theory that 
avoids or resolves all three of Forsey’s challenges, this fact does not entail that the task is 
logically impossible. Hanauer makes this point after explaining that the paradox of negative 
emotion remains a live one: “In any case, none of this should dissuade us from thinking that a 
theory of the sublime is possible. It simply poses a demand to clarify and explain the affective 
content of sublimity and its source.”5 Despite the little ground Forsey explicitly concedes in her 
reply to critics (namely, her use of epistemic terms in her interpretation of Kant’s sublime), 
readers come across less-confident language at important junctures in this second essay 
compared to her first. For example, she says “we aestheticians have not yet adequately 
resolved”6 the negative emotion paradox, and that she is “certainly open to [more] suggestions” 
to resolve it;7 she concludes that “we appear forced” to go down old and problematic routes in 
trying to distinguish between beauty and the sublime; and that, overall, “I have tried to…more 
clearly articulate the ways in which the sublime remains problematic, or seems so to me.”8  
This change in Forsey’s tone is warranted. Shapshay, for example, challenges two of 
Forsey’s rather restrictive (and related) views: 1) Forsey suggests that the only adequate 
explanation for the pleasurable aspect of the sublime is the moment of Kantian moral 
 
5 Hanauer (2017) p.42. 
6 Forsey (2017) p.94 (my emphasis). 
7 Forsey (2017) p.95. 
8 Forsey (2017) p.104.  
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transcendence and 2) one cannot resolve the negative emotion paradox by claiming that there 
are two objects in the sublime experience (one that elicits fear or pain and one that elicits 
pleasure), as it will necessarily include a moment of transcendence (which leads back to the 
transcendence paradox). Shapshay’s discussion of Donovan Webster’s sublime experience of 
exploring a volcano highlights two different objects within the experience—neither of which 
involve a moment of transcendence—and explains the pleasurable aspects of the sublime. As 
Webster lowers himself down into the volcano, he feels fear or terror towards aspects of the 
environment that remind him that one slip of the rope would lead to his death (e.g., the acidic 
gases biting his nose and eyes or knowledge that the lava is 2,200 degrees Fahrenheit). At the 
same time, he feels exhilarating pleasure in attending aesthetically to the deep orangey red light 
and “pumpkin sized globs of ejected lava”—things he describes as “stupefyingly beautiful.”9 
Considering this example together with Hanauer’s views about adequate theories of the sublime 
and obscure objects provide some new plausible ways to navigate through Forsey’s three 
challenges.  
This all suggests that what this book offers—by its end—is not a robust argument for 
the impossibility of a theory of the sublime but, rather, a rich and thought-provoking discussion 
about the challenges facing extant accounts and suggests some ways to move forward: things of 
importance and interest to contemporary theorists of the sublime. 
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9 Shapshay (2017) p.73. 
